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POLICE MISCONDUCT, VIDEO RECORDING, 
AND PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO RIGHTS 
ENFORCEMENT* 
HOWARD M. WASSERMAN** 
The story of police reform has become the story of video and 
video evidence, and “record everything to know the truth” has 
become the singular mantra. Video, both police-created and 
citizen-created, has become the singular tool for ensuring police 
accountability, reforming law enforcement, and enforcing the 
rights of victims of police misconduct. This Article explores 
procedural problems surrounding the use of video recording and 
video evidence to counter police misconduct, hold individual 
officers and governments accountable, and reform departmental 
policies, regulations, and practices. It considers four issues: (1) 
the mistaken belief that video can “speak for itself” and the 
procedural and evidentiary problems flowing from that mistaken 
belief; (2) the evidentiary advantages video offers police and 
prosecutors; (3) the effects of video on government decisions to 
pursue criminal charges against police officers and to settle civil-
rights suits alleging police misconduct; and (4) significant 
procedural limits on efforts to enforce a First Amendment right 
to record, such as qualified immunity and standing. 
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The story of police reform and of “policing the police” has 
become the story of video and video evidence. “Record everything to 
know the truth” has become the mantra. Video has become the 
singular tool for ensuring police accountability, reforming law-
enforcement policies and practices, and vindicating and enforcing the 
constitutional rights of victims of police misconduct. Video can 
vindicate the public’s rights against police misconduct, assist the 
government in punishing misbehaving officers and departments, and 
enable agencies to reform problematic and constitutionally defective 
policies and practices. From the law-enforcement perspective, video 
enables officers to prove that their conduct was constitutionally 
appropriate, avoiding civil and criminal liability for the officers and 
their departments. And government can use video to rebut criticism 
that it is failing to protect the public. 
Videos of police-citizen encounters fall into three categories. The 
first is police-controlled video, which is created from body cameras, 
dashboard cameras, traffic-light cameras, and other government-
controlled and -operated surveillance technology. The second is 
citizen1-controlled video, created from smart phones and cell phones, 
small digital video and audio recorders, private-business surveillance 
cameras, and similar privately owned, controlled, and operated 
recording technology, shared through texts, blogs, and social-
networking sites. The third, although less-discussed, is live 
mainstream media coverage of large or breaking police-public 
 
 1. I use the word “citizen” to mean all members of the public, without intending to 
distinguish individuals who are citizens of the United States and individuals who are 
otherwise present in the United States, lawfully or otherwise. 
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encounters,2 such as the saturation coverage of the protests cum riots 
in Ferguson in 2014.3 Mainstream media also enhances the power and 
force of the first two categories by publicizing and distributing “viral” 
videos created by other sources. 
Arming everyone, public and private, with recording devices 
produces a balance of power in which all sides record police-public 
encounters. Big Brother is watching the people, but the people are 
watching Big Brother. Ric Simmons recognized the special potential 
role of citizen-controlled video in ensuring government 
accountability: “It is now evident that Orwell’s vision was wrong. 
Modern technology has turned out to be the totalitarian state’s worst 
enemy .	.	.	. [I]t is the people who are watching the government, not 
the other way around.”4 Mary Fan praises this balanced “modern 
condition where everyone has incentive to record to contest or 
control the narrative.”5 She explains that 
people and the police are recording each other from all 
directions, making everyone at once surveilled and surveillor. I 
am recording you, you are recording me, and the police are 
recording us too, because the people demand it. The lines of 
power and control radiate from all directions as people seek to 
document their perceptions and thus shape the narrative.6 
Jocelyn Simonson identifies institutionalized mutual surveillance 
in the practice of “organized copwatching—groups of local residents 
who wear uniforms, carry visible recording devices, patrol 
neighborhoods, and film police-citizen interactions in an effort to 
hold police departments accountable to the populations they police.”7 
Multiple constituencies support expanded use of body cameras 
and similar recording technology as the solution to police misconduct 
and the catalyst of police reform. Fan argues that this universality of 
 
 2. See TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT 
LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 257–58 (2009); Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: 
Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 604 (2009). 
 3. Candice Norwood, Media Framing in Black and White: The Construction of Black 
Male Identity, in FERGUSON’S FAULT LINES: THE RACE QUAKE THAT ROCKED A 
NATION 167, 167–68 (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2016); Howard M. Wasserman, Moral 
Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 832–33 (2015). 
 4. Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology’s 
Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
531, 532 (2007). 
 5. Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 897, 908 (2017). 
 6. Mary D. Fan, Democratizing Proof: Pooling Public and Police Body Camera 
Videos, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1643 (2018). 
 7. Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 391 (2016). 
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support demonstrates the “interest convergence thesis,” in which the 
“convergence of diverse interests across unusual bedfellows	.	.	. 
create[s] a major shift in the recording of police encounters in the 
United States.”8 
Broad public support for video technology is reflected in opinion 
polls9 and in support for a WhiteHouse.gov petition begun shortly 
after the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown and corresponding protests 
in Ferguson, Missouri.10 The Obama Administration and the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) under Attorneys General Eric 
Holder and Loretta Lynch promoted video as a path to police reform. 
Efforts included grants to law enforcement agencies to establish or 
enhance body-camera programs, such as $75 million awarded in 
December 201411 and $20 million awarded to 106 agencies in 
September 2016.12 The DOJ entered consent decrees in civil rights 
actions13 against police departments in Ferguson14 and Baltimore15 
that required both departments to establish and maintain effective 
body-camera programs. Federal body-camera bills have been offered 
in Congress.16 A 2014 joint report by the DOJ and the Police 
 
 8. Fan, supra note 5, at 927. 
 9. Sharp Racial Divisions in Reactions to Brown, Garner Decisions: Many Blacks 
Expect Police-Minority Relations to Worsen, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 8, 2014), 
http://www.people-press.org/2014/12/08/sharp-racial-divisions-in-reactions-to-brown-garner-
decisions/ [https://perma.cc/U9YE-JJ5A]. 
 10. See Aja J. Williams, Petition Asking Cops to Wear Body Cameras Passes 100K, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 20, 2014, 12:11 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics
/2014/08/20/mike-brown-law-petition/14336311/ [https://perma.cc/P8SS-93UV]. 
 11. David A. Harris, John Murray Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, University 
of Pittsburgh School of Law, Collection and Use Panel Discussion at the North Carolina 
Law Review Symposium (Nov. 3, 2017) (recording available at https://vimeo.com/groups
/275981/videos/24211131 [https://perma.cc/A3L7-BRVF]). 
 12. Department of Justice Awards over $20 Million to Law Enforcement Body-Worn 
Camera Programs, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr
/department-justice-awards-over-20-million-law-enforcement-body-worn-camera-programs 
[https://perma.cc/36AH-EUYH]. 
 13. See 34 U.S.C.A. §	12601(b) (West 2017) (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. §	14141). 
See Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 741–44 
(2017) (explaining the history and operation of §	14141 civil actions). 
 14. See Consent Decree at 1, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-CV-000180-
CDP (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/833431/download 
[https://perma.cc/2K7J-PHBE]. 
 15. See Consent Decree at 1, United States v. Police Dep’t of Balt., No. 1:17-CV-
00099-JKB (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2017), http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3284089
/Conset-Decree-Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJW2-CWNW]. 
 16. See Police Creating Accountability by Making Effective Recording Available Act 
of 2015 (Police CAMERA Act), H.R. 1680, 114th Cong. (2015); Arthur Delaney, Adam 
Schiff Pushes Body Cameras for Cops, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 27, 2014 11:55 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/27/body-worn-cameras_n_5722762.html [https://perma.cc
/2S4S-T5TF]. 
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Executive Research Forum (“PERF”) offered more than thirty 
recommendations for state and local departments in establishing body 
cameras, the central point being that agency policies and training 
materials must provide clear, specific, and detailed guidelines on all 
aspects of the use of cameras.17 The 2015 Final Report of the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing identified new 
policing technology, including cameras, as a pillar of modern policing 
and recommended expanded study and use.18 The American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) drafted model body-camera legislation, 
requiring that officers record all encounters, subject to limited 
exceptions, with broad disclosure of videos.19 
Two stakeholders do not share this enthusiasm. One is rank-and-
file police officers and officer unions. Initially supportive, they have 
backed away, concerned with lack of control over the decision when 
to record and over subsequent release and use of the resulting video, 
fearing officer embarrassment or worse.20 
The more problematic holdout is the Trump Administration and 
the DOJ under Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who reject the basic 
premise of the need for local police reform or of federal oversight as a 
vehicle for achieving it. Shortly after President Trump’s inauguration, 
the White House web page announced a policy of “Standing Up For 
Our Law Enforcement Community.”21 The new Administration 
would “honor our men and women in uniform and .	.	. support their 
mission of protecting the public,” insisting that the “dangerous anti-
police atmosphere in America is wrong [and] the Trump 
Administration will end it.”22 Early in his tenure, Sessions pledged to 
 
 17. See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN 
CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 38–49 (2014), 
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/implementi
ng%20a%20body-worn%20camera%20program.pdf [https://perma.cc/4983-AK2Z]. 
 18. OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL 
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 31 (2015), 
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/XY7R-3GC9]. 
 19. A Model Act for	Regulating the Use of Wearable Body Cameras by Law 
Enforcement, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/model-act-regulating-use-wearable-body
-cameras-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/DX2S-TU4R]. 
 20. See Bryce Clayton Newell & Ruben Greidanus, Officer Discretion and the Choice 
to Record: Officer Attitudes Towards Body-Worn Camera Activation, 96 N.C. L. REV. 
1525, 1549–50 (2018); Michael D. White & Henry F. Fradella, The Intersection of Law, 
Policy, and Police Body-Worn Cameras: An Exploration of Critical Issues, 96 N.C. L. REV. 
1579, 1584 (2018). 
 21. Dara Lind, Trump’s White House Site Promises to End the “Anti-Police 
Atmosphere” in America, VOX (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2017/1/20/14338632
/trump-whitehouse-gov-blue-lives-matter [https://www.perma.cc/4NL6-PFKG]. 
 22. Id. 
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pull back from his predecessors’ aggressive use of civil actions and 
consent decrees imposing federal judicial oversight of local police 
departments, in favor of helping police officers better perform their 
jobs without undermining respect for law enforcement or making 
officers’ jobs more difficult.23 Sessions later issued a memorandum 
identifying a series of principles the department would seek to 
advance, including promoting officer safety, officer morale, and 
public respect for police work.24 It is not clear how cameras and video 
fit the administration’s new mission and focus with respect to police 
reform—whether they help police better perform their jobs or 
whether they reflect an anti-police attitude and a new means of 
interfering and undermining respect for police. 
The Trump Administration’s recalcitrance on police-controlled 
recording places in stark relief the dramatic and immediate change 
from the Obama Administration with respect to all federal efforts at 
police reform. The ancien administration made extensive use of 
§	14141 civil actions for equitable relief against patterns-and-practices 
of constitutionally violative behavior in state and local law-
enforcement agencies, obtaining consent decrees against more than 
thirty departments.25 The Trump Administration and Sessions DOJ 
doubt that patterns and practices of constitutional misconduct exist, 
as opposed to occasional lone bad actors.26 It remains to be seen how 
that worldview affects the use of police- or citizen-controlled video. 
Following the transition to the new administration, the DOJ asked 
the court for a ninety-day delay in approving the Baltimore consent 
decree to allow it to revise or reconsider the agreement; the district 
judge refused, insisting that the time for negotiation had passed.27 
Citizen-controlled video has become as prominent and essential 
to reform efforts as police-controlled video. The Ferguson and 
Baltimore consent decrees required both departments to recognize, 
respect, and train officers to protect the right to “observe and record 
 
 23. Kevin Johnson, Attorney General Jeff Sessions: ‘We Are in Danger’ of Rising 
Violence, USA TODAY (Feb. 28, 2017, 12:39 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/politics/2017/02/28/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-we-danger-rising-violence/98524544/ [https://perma.cc
/CKQ5-HNL5]. 
 24. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys (Mar. 31, 2017), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3535148-Consentdecreebaltimore.html [https://perma.cc
/9LZ3-Z2WZ]. 
 25. Rushin & Edwards, supra note 13, at 779. 
 26. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, supra note 24. 
 27. Daniel Victor, Judge Approves Consent Decree to Overhaul Baltimore Police 
Department, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/baltimore-
justice-department-police-consent-decree.html [https//perma.cc/PV3T-92VV (dark archive)]. 
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officers in the public discharge of their duties in all traditionally 
public spaces”28 and to “peacefully photograph or record police 
officers performing their law enforcement duties in public.”29 
Ferguson previously acknowledged First Amendment protection for 
the right to record in a consent decree resolving a §	1983 action 
arising from the 2014 protests.30 Six federal courts of appeals—the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,31 Ninth 
Circuit,32 First Circuit,33 Seventh Circuit,34 Fifth Circuit,35 and Third 
Circuit36—have recognized a First Amendment right for members of 
the public to record police and other public officials performing their 
public functions in public spaces. In 2012, the DOJ adopted the 
litigation position that “[r]ecording governmental officers engaged in 
public duties is a form of speech through which private individuals 
may gather and disseminate information of public concern, including 
the conduct of law enforcement officers.”37 
Late 2017–2018 offers an opportune moment to consider video 
and its role in police reform, in criminal prosecution, and in civil 
rights litigation surrounding citizens’ right to record police-public 
encounters. This period marks significant technological anniversaries. 
The iPhone, which has made citizen video pervasive, turned ten in 
2017,38 while digital video-recording technology, alone and in cell 
phones, is about fifteen years old.39 More than half of adults in the 
United States have smartphones and more than ninety percent have 
cell phones.40 Dashcam technology was introduced in the late 1980s 
but became prominent approximately twenty years ago in the early 
 
 28. Consent Decree, supra note 14, at 26. 
 29. Consent Decree, supra note 15, at 84. 
 30. See Order by Consent at 1, Hussein v. Cty. of Saint Louis, No. 4:14-cv-1410-JAR 
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2014); Complaint at 1, Hussein, No. 4:14-cv-1410 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 14, 
2014). 
 31. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 32. Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 33. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 34. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 35. Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 688 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 36. Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 37. Letter from Jonathan M. Sharp, Chief of Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Mark H. Grimes, Office of Legal Affairs, Balt. Police Dep’t (May 14, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/05/17/Sharp_ltr_5-14-12.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U7TH-ZCUV]. 
 38. Arielle Pardes, iPhone Turns 10: How It Became the Everything Machine, WIRED 
(June 29, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/iphone-turns-10-how-it-became-
the-everything-machine/ [https://perma.cc/D8UG-RDMU]. 
 39. Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, 
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 339–40 (2011). 
 40. Fan, supra note 5, at 907. 
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2000s, promoted through federal funding for recording technology in 
response to an increase in public assaults on officers and in allegations 
of police abuse.41 Body camera technology developed in Britain in 
2005 and came to the United States around ten years ago.42 
This period also marks significant legal and political 
anniversaries. The transition in civil rights enforcement commitments 
from Obama to Trump is in full swing more than one year into the 
Trump presidency. It has been ten years since the Supreme Court in 
Scott v. Harris43 approved summary judgment based on dashcam 
video of a police chase, concluding that video evidence can “speak for 
itself”44 in telling a singular story with which no reasonable jury could 
disagree.45 It has been eight years since publication of the Harvard 
Law Review article in which Dan Kahan, David Hoffman, and Daniel 
Braman destroyed the underlying premise of Scott, showing that what 
that video (and, by logical extension, all video) showed depended on 
who was watching.46 And it has been ten years since Simmons’s 
insight, offered prior to the exponential acceleration of the 
technological revolution of smartphones and body cameras, about 
Orwell and the power of the public to watch, record, and check the 
government.47 
I have written about video evidence, in particular the insistence 
that body cameras offer the solution to the problem of police 
misconduct. I have described my position as uncertain-but-cautious 
hope and support—cameras are a good idea, but the details of how 
camera programs operate and how video evidence is used in litigation 
and public debate matter.48 The rhetoric surrounding recording of 
police must reflect the reality—the benefits of video and video 
evidence in providing police transparency, government 
accountability, and litigation accuracy, while perhaps real, should not 
 
 41. Bradley X. Barbour, Big Budget Productions with Limited Release: Video 
Retention Issues with Body-Worn Cameras, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1725, 1730–31 (2017). 
 42. Id. 
 43. 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 44. Id. at 378 n.5. 
 45. Id. at 380. 
 46. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You 
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 837, 841 (2009). 
 47. Simmons, supra note 4, at 531. 
 48. Howard M. Wasserman, The Uncertain Hope of Body Cameras, in FERGUSON’S 
FAULT LINES: THE RACE QUAKE THAT ROCKED A NATION, supra note 3, at 217, 218 
[hereinafter Wasserman, The Uncertain Hope]; Howard M. Wasserman, Recording of and 
by Police: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 20 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 543, 547 (2017); 
Wasserman, supra note 3, at 833; Wasserman, supra note 2, at 608–09. 
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be overstated. And “perhaps” is an important qualifier, as a recent 
study of body cameras involving more than 2000 officers in 
Washington, D.C. showed no “detectable average effects” on 
documented uses of force, citizen complaints, or behavior by police or 
citizens in public encounters.49 The more-mixed empirical record has 
not dampened the technological enthusiasm, however. 
This Article approaches the question of video and police reform 
from a different angle. It explores procedural challenges in using 
video in civil50 and criminal51 litigation challenging, ex ante or ex post, 
law-enforcement misconduct; in the efforts to hold individual officers 
or departments accountable; and in the efforts to reform 
departmental policies, regulations, and practices. Part I criticizes the 
continued belief among courts, government officials, and 
commentators that video “speaks for itself,” the procedural and 
evidentiary errors to which that belief leads, and the problems it 
creates for civil rights enforcement. Part II considers the evidentiary 
advantages video offers law enforcement in civil rights litigation—
whether prosecution and police using video in a criminal prosecution 
against the citizen involved in the encounter or officers using video as 
defendants in civil litigation. Part III explores the promise and limits 
of citizen-created and controlled video, considering the existence and 
nature of a First Amendment right to record police performing their 
public duties in public and the problems in enforcing and vindicating 
that right. Part IV considers the effects of video outside of litigation; 
these include executive decisions to pursue criminal charges against 
police officers for misconduct and to settle civil rights litigation in 
response to public outrage at a video-recorded incident. 
I.  “ALLOW THE VIDEO TO SPEAK FOR ITSELF” 
Scott v. Harris was a §	1983 action arising from a high-speed 
police chase that ended when the pursuing officer intentionally 
rammed the fleeing car, causing it to careen off the road and into a 
ravine, leaving the driver permanently paralyzed.52 The primary 
 
 49. White & Fradella, supra note 20, at 1586–88; Randomized Controlled Trial of the 
Metropolitan Police Dep’t Body-Worn Camera Program, LAB @ DC, 
http://bwc.thelab.dc.gov/ [https://perma.cc/MLD3-75ZP]; Amanda Ripley, A Big Test of 
Police Body Cameras Defies Expectations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/upshot/a-big-test-of-police-body-cameras-defies-
expectations.html [https://perma.cc/JG5Z-6X9T (dark archive)]. 
 50. 34 U.S.C.A. §	12601 (West 2017) (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. §	14141); 42 
U.S.C. §	1983 (2012). 
 51. 18 U.S.C. §	242. 
 52. 550 U.S. 372, 374–75 (2007). 
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evidence in the record was dashcam video from the pursuing officer’s 
squad car, which the Court posted to its website so it could “speak for 
itself.”53 With only Justice Stevens dissenting, the Court held that 
summary judgment in favor of the officer was proper on the driver’s 
Fourth Amendment claim. The video told only one, “quite .	.	. 
different” story from the driver’s testimony—that the driver, traveling 
at a high rate of speed and weaving in and out of traffic, posed an 
imminent risk to persons in the immediate area, making 
constitutionally reasonable the use of force to terminate the chase 
and end the threat to the public.54 Video, in the Court’s telling, 
provided conclusive objective evidence telling a singular story. That 
single story overrode, and allowed the court on summary judgment to 
disregard, all competing evidence, including the victim’s testimony 
that he was driving safely (if fast) and did not pose a threat to the 
public because the roads were empty.55 The Court could disregard 
that testimony because it was “blatantly contradicted by the 
record”56—that is, by the video, which possessed one objective, 
obvious meaning that a court could determine and that no reasonable 
jury could understand differently, regardless of how it judged the 
victim’s testimony and credibility. 
The Scott Court fundamentally misunderstood video and video 
evidence. Video does not possess a singular meaning or tell a singular 
story to all viewers that obviates the need for a factfinder or grants a 
court such leeway on summary judgment. Video functions as any 
other piece of evidence—it captures and offers limited information 
and its meaning must be processed and understood by whoever views 
or hears that limited information.57 
From the front end of what video presents comes the insight 
familiar to every undergraduate film student—what a video “says” or 
“means” is limited by what is inside and outside the camera’s frame, 
what is included or not included in the image, and the “camera’s 
perspective (angles) and breadth of view (wide shots and focus).”58 
Meaning changes with the length of the video, steadiness of the 
 
 53. Id. at 378 n.5. 
 54. Id. at 379–80. 
 55. See id. at 378–80. 
 56. Id. at 380. 
 57. See Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1410–
14 (2018). 
 58. Jessica Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & 
CLASS 17, 29 (2008). 
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camera,59 and other details of the recording, such as distances, 
perspectives, light, color, sound, sound quality, visual quality, and 
angles.60 “All films have a point of view or voice,”61 but the voice and 
story change from different angles, details, perspectives, and points of 
view reflected in different videos.62 
The back end recognizes that video, like any other piece of 
evidence, must be processed, interpreted, and understood by the 
factfinder.63 The work of Dan Kahan and his coauthors at Yale’s 
Cultural Cognition Project64 has explored and revealed the nature of 
and influences on that interpretation.65 Their empirical studies expose 
the fallacy of Scott and those who insist that video offers an absolute 
truth or singularity. They show that video does not speak for itself: 
what video “says” depends on who is watching and the priors each 
viewer brings with her. Video’s meaning is affected by a complex 
combination of cultural, demographic, social, political, racial, gender, 
ideological, and experiential characteristics. That is, reasonable jurors 
could disagree about the meaning of a video because that meaning is 
influenced, if not determined, by the personal and political 
characteristics each juror brings to her task of viewing, interpreting, 
and understanding.66 
Two Kahan studies are relevant to this discussion. The first is the 
landmark 2009 study in Whose Eyes are You Going to Believe, in 
which the authors took the Scott Court up on its offer to let video 
speak for itself by showing the chase video to study participants. 
While the majority of viewers in the study interpreted the video as the 
Court had, the minority of viewers who disagreed with the Court’s 
view shared demographic and ideological characteristics and “a 
distinctive understanding of social reality that informs their view of 
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 64. Members, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCH., 
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the facts.”67 The second study is They Saw a Protest, in which the 
participants viewed video depicting a crowd outside a building that 
was alternately identified as a reproductive-health clinic or a military 
recruitment center during the period in which openly LGBT persons 
were barred from military service.68 Opinions about abortion and 
about LGBT rights corresponded with whether a viewer saw a 
peaceful-but-emphatic protest or a riot and threatening blockade of 
the building.69 
Both studies explain public reactions to high-profile video cases. 
Positions and experiences on race, class, law-and-order, and the 
theory of “broken windows” policing influence how viewers interpret 
video of the strangulation death of Eric Garner at the hands of New 
York City Police Officer Daniel Pantaleo.70 Viewer reactions to video 
of protests and police attempts to break-up protests—for example, in 
Ferguson and elsewhere following the shooting death of Michael 
Brown71 or the non-indictment of Officer Darren Wilson in the 
Brown shooting,72 or in St. Louis following the 2017 acquittal of 
Officer Jason Stockley in the shooting death of Anthony Lamar 
Smith73—track viewer positions on law-and-order, the freedom of 
speech, the propriety of public protest in public spaces, and, likely, 
the underlying events and judicial decisions being protested.74 A 
viewer who believes that the protested shooting was wrongful and 
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 70. Joseph Goldstein & Marc Santora, Staten Island Man Died From Chokehold 
During Arrest, Autopsy Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2014, at A14. 
 71. Chad Flanders, Ferguson and the First Amendment, in FERGUSON’S FAULT LINES: 
THE RACE QUAKE THAT ROCKED A NATION, supra note 3, at 197, 198, 206–07; see also 
Annys Shin, Recalling the Protests, Riots After Fatal Police Shooting of Michael Brown, 




 72. Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer is Not 
Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-
darren-wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html [https://perma.cc/RJK7-XDF5 (dark 
archive)]; Nicholas St. Fleur, Scenes From a Ferguson Protest in New York City, ATLANTIC 
(Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/11/scenes-from-new-
york-citys-ferguson-protest/383154/ [https://perma.cc/WVQ8-ZXTK]. 
 73. Mark Berman, Wesley Lowery & Andrew deGrandpre, Police and Protesters 
Clash in St. Louis After Former Officer who Shot Black Driver Acquitted on Murder 
Charges, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2017/09/15/st-louis-tenses-for-verdict-in-murder-trial-of-former-police-officer/ 
[https://perma.cc/P6NE-X6HF (dark archive)]. 
 74. Flanders, supra note 71, at 198. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1313 (2018) 
2018] VIDEO RECORDING & RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 1325 
that public protest is essential First Amendment activity promoting 
social change is more likely to see a constitutionally protected 
peaceful protest broken up by overzealous police; a viewer who 
believes the shooting was justified is more likely to see outnumbered 
police struggling to maintain order against a lawless riot. 
Nevertheless, courts and commentators continue to espouse 
Scott’s mistaken position on the “truth” of recording evidence and 
how it can be used in litigation. Video continues to be treated as an 
objective, unbiased, transparent observer that evenhandedly 
reproduces events for the viewer, providing raw, unambiguous, and 
unbiased evidence showing conclusively and certainly what happened 
in the real world. Courts continue to use video to relieve themselves 
of traditional reliance on one-sided testimony to reconstruct events, 
to check the fallibility of human perception, and to allow factfinders 
to replay and perceive events free of adverseness, passion, and 
partisanship that plague traditional witness testimony.75 Video 
continues to be seen as more likely to be “much more accurate than 
other means of conveying information,” which “increases the 
credibility and reliability of expression but also .	.	. may allow more 
information to be translated quickly and in a manner unfiltered by a 
third-party account.”76 In recognizing a First Amendment right to 
record, the Third Circuit argued that video “corroborates or lays 
aside subjective impressions for objective facts.”77 
The problem is a failure to distinguish persuasiveness from moral 
certainty. Video may be a more “credible representation[] of that 
reality” that can “persuade all the more powerfully[,]	.	.	. generat[ing] 
less counterargument and .	.	. retain[ing] [the viewers’] belief.”78 
Video can “validate or undermine” accounts of events and “help 
resolve the conflict not only for the parties immediately involved but 
also in the interests of the broader community.”79 But courts must 
resist what literature scholar Peter Brooks calls the “reality effect”—
that video is, in and of itself, the thing or event depicted, rather than 
one more piece of evidence of the thing depicted that a factfinder can 
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interpret, consider, and use.80 The failure to distinguish the concepts 
undermines the process in which courts resolve disputes. 
The Supreme Court repeated its mistake, this time unanimously, 
in Plumhoff v. Rickard.81 The Court again approved summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant officers on a Fourth Amendment 
excessive force claim arising from a high-speed chase, again 
understanding the dashcam video as telling one obvious story of a 
plaintiff posing a grave risk to public safety that officers properly 
terminated with deadly force, even at the risk of serious injury or 
death to the “fleeing” motorist.82 As in Scott, the Court accepted that 
the video in the record showed conclusively that the plaintiff posed a 
threat to the public with his “outrageously reckless driving.”83 The 
video “conclusively disprove[d]” the plaintiff’s allegations about 
whether the chase was over, whether he intended to resume flight, 
and whether he still was maneuvering the car.84 And the video 
showed that the driver was “obviously pushing down on the 
accelerator” and that he “threw the car into reverse ‘in an attempt to 
escape.’”85 The Court could decide this from its review of the video, 
with neither further proceedings nor factfinding necessary or 
appropriate. Unlike Scott, Plumhoff did not acknowledge the role of 
video in its decision. Justice Alito’s majority opinion recited facts and 
described what happened during the chase, without identifying video 
as the source of its facts or conclusions and without placing the video 
on the Court website for the public to watch and consider.86 Only 
references to video during argument87 and the Court’s emphasis on 
Scott as controlling precedent revealed the video’s prominent role in 
the case. 
The evidentiary limits of video become clear in cases with 
multiple or competing videos. A second video, taken from a different, 
broader angle, tells a different and often contradictory story than 
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does the first video from a body camera’s producing a limited-field 
video that offers little context for a close-up image.88 There is a reason 
that every witness to an incident or to police activities has her phone 
out—each wants to create and maintain a unique record of events 
because each recording provides a unique piece of evidence offering a 
unique story.89 But if different videos of the same occurrence tell 
different stories depending on the internal elements of that video—
especially a different angle and different width of visual field—no 
single video can be correct or can tell the entire story. 
Argument in 2017’s Hernandez v. Mesa90 produced an exchange 
that should have revealed how courts have gone astray in their 
reliance on video. Hernandez was a Bivens action against a border-
patrol officer arising from a cross-border shooting—the officer was 
standing in the United States when he fired, while the victim, a 
Mexican national, was standing at or near the Rio Grande culvert 
marking the U.S.-Mexico border.91 The officer was cleared by a 
departmental investigation.92 Several surveillance cameras captured 
the incident, with one video from one camera circulating on 
YouTube.93 During argument, the following colloquy occurred 
between Justice Sotomayor and counsel for the United States: 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: .	.	. And I understand you say the 
government has investigated and sees the facts differently. 
Have you seen the -- the film that appeared on the YouTube? 
MR. KNEEDLER: I have. 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I did, and I can’t square the police 
officer’s account of this incident with that film. 
MR. KNEEDLER: There were other videos. The -- the -- the 
press release -- nothing in the record and nothing in a -- in a 
public account -- * * * --- there was other evidence and other 
video --surveillance videos that were taken into account in the 
investigation.94 
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Unfortunately, everyone missed the point and its significance for 
debates over cameras and video evidence (which were not the issues 
before the Court). If other videos could justify a different result in the 
departmental investigation despite one adverse video, no single video 
can be conclusive as a matter of law. Every video offers one unique 
perspective out of multiple perspectives on one story, none 
necessarily truer than another.95 And if non-video evidence could 
justify a different outcome in the departmental investigation despite 
the adverse video, then contradicting non-video evidence should play 
a similar role in civil rights litigation. A court should not grant 
summary judgment based on its singular view of what video says 
while disregarding contrary non-video evidence. As a court on 
summary judgment cannot choose between competing witness 
accounts,96 so should it not choose between competing videos or 
between competing video and testimonial evidence. A factfinder 
should be given an opportunity to review all disparate pieces of 
evidence, determine their meaning and credibility, and make its 
decision. 
The public reaction to the outcomes of prosecutions of police 
officers in cases with publicly disclosed body camera and dashcam 
evidence illustrates the error of Scott and the correctness of Kahan’s 
insights that video can have multiple reasonable meanings and 
messages.97 In a string of notorious shooting cases, decisions not to 
charge or convict police officers contradicted the wider public 
perception of the videos, triggering public outrage, protests, and 
demonstrations.98 Accepting that the public was not protesting the 
outcome simpliciter—a white police officer was not convicted of 
shooting an African-American person, ergo the outcome was unjust 
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and grounds for protest—the anger must have been based on 
different perceptions, understandings, and conclusions from the video 
evidence. And those different perceptions, understandings, and 
conclusions derived from distinct demographics, political attitudes, 
and life experiences that Kahan and his coauthors identified as 
influencing how viewers understand video. That the public could 
disagree with the prosecutor, grand jury, jury, or judge means video 
cannot be singular—either different viewers reached different 
conclusions about the meaning of the video or other evidence 
affected the prevailing view of the video within the formal 
proceeding. Either way, video did not present a single truth but could 
be and was overcome by something beyond the images themselves. 
It is not clear who reached the “correct” or “accurate” result in 
these cases—the non-convicting factfinders or the righteously 
indignant public.99 It does not matter. The point is that video is 
subjective and courts, the public, and commentators err in assuming 
its objectivity and singularity. 
The judicial process must recognize and incorporate this insight, 
as judges are uniquely equipped to do.100 Courts cannot throw away 
the ordinary rules of evidence and procedure when video is part of 
the record. A court on summary judgment cannot view the evidence 
“in the light depicted by the videotape”101 because the videotape lacks 
a singular light in which other evidence can be viewed. The video, as 
any other piece of evidence, must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-movant on summary judgment because the jury 
(or individual jurors) may (and statistically, some will) view the video 
differently than the judge, based on their distinct attitudes and 
experiences. And none of those competing viewpoints should be 
boxed or rejected as unreasonable.102 
That insight applies beyond summary judgment. At most trials, 
video evidence will prevail over competing testimonial evidence 
because factfinders see video as “more salient than verbal 
descriptions.”103 Kahan’s studies about viewer interpretation and 
scholarship about how video forms and presents its message therefore 
remain significant at trial. They should remind courts that the place 
for subjective interpretations of video and comparison with non-video 
evidence is a trial before a factfinder, not summary judgment that 
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preempts the ordinary civil-litigation process and labels competing 
understandings of video unreasonable.104 They also should remind 
factfinders in civil and criminal proceedings not to place blind faith in 
video but to recognize its limitations and its connections with and 
complementarity to non-video evidence. Video is one piece of 
evidence among many. Factfinders must decide the case in light of all 
the evidence, including their subjective and personal interpretations 
in understanding and applying video evidence. 
II.  EVIDENTIARY ADVANTAGES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Commentators have described the evidentiary advantages that 
police officers enjoy in litigation, as witnesses in criminal prosecutions 
against arrestees and as defendants in civil and criminal 
proceedings.105 Judges and juries tend to view officers’ testimony as 
more credible than that of citizens in a he-said/he-said contest 
between one police officer and one suspect,106 an “ugly battle” that is 
“highly imbalanced.”107 Judges and juries are reluctant to openly 
discredit law-enforcement officer testimony, where an adverse finding 
that the officer is lying or is not credible could destroy a career.108 
Advocates argue that video evidence can overcome that 
imbalance by offering objective information that does not depend on 
credibility determinations or the subjectivity of adversary 
proceedings.109 But the tendency to believe law-enforcement 
testimony has migrated into how courts view video evidence, with the 
jury (or court on summary judgment) more likely to adopt officers’ 
asserted interpretation of the video’s singular meaning and story at 
the expense of a competing narrative of the video’s meaning. The 
Supreme Court did this on summary judgment in Scott and Plumhoff. 
Lower courts grant summary judgment for officers by relying on 
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ambiguous or apparently police-friendly video110 or by ignoring 
adverse video.111 This tendency has accompanied a shift in law 
enforcement’s view of the purpose of police-controlled video—not to 
expose official wrongdoing or trigger government accountability, but 
to obtain evidence for criminal prosecutions of members of the public 
involved in those police encounters.112 
The 2017 acquittal of former St. Louis police officer Michael 
Stockley illustrates the tendency. Stockley was charged in state court 
with murder arising from the shooting death of Anthony Lamar 
Smith following a high-speed chase. The case presented numerous 
recording-evidence issues. Dashcam video of the chase captured 
Stockley during the chase telling his partner “we’re killing this 
motherfucker.” Video of the aftermath showed Stockley walking to 
the victim’s car, firing five shots, returning to his squad car and rifling 
through a bag, then returning to Smith’s car. At that point, another 
officer turned the dashcam off, leaving only a blurry cellphone video, 
taken by a bystander, as evidence. That citizen-controlled video did 
not clearly show whether Stockley was carrying a second gun (the 
prosecution alleged that Stockley planted a gun in Smith’s car to set-
up a self-defense defense) when he went to Smith’s car the second 
time.113 
In a bench trial, the judge resolved every video issue in 
Stockley’s favor. Recorded comments about “killing” Smith were 
ambiguous, a means of releasing tension during the chase rather than 
a statement of intent. The court drew no adverse inferences from 
officers turning the dashcam off or from Stockley’s violating 
department procedure in rifling through a bag in his car or moving 
back and forth between Smith’s car and the squad car. And the 
ambiguity of the blurry citizen video meant that the state had not 
proven that Stockley planted a second gun.114 
 
 110. See Gillis v. Pollard, 554 F. App’x 502, 504–05 (7th Cir. 2014); Kalfus v. N.Y. & 
Presbyterian Hosp., 476 F. App’x 877, 880–81 (2d Cir. 2012); Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 
F.3d 234, 239, 248–49 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 111. See Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App’x 791, 792 n.1, 796 (11th Cir. 2008). But see 
id. at 799–801, 804 (Martin, J., dissenting) (emphasizing and detailing video in finding use 
of force unreasonable). 
 112. Harris, Collection and Use Panel Discussion at the North Carolina Law Review 
Symposium, supra note 11. 
 113. Jeremy Stahl, This Judge’s Excuses for Acquitting Jason Stockley of Murder are 
Pathetic, SLATE (Sept. 15, 2017, 6:01 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2017/09
/15/this_judge_s_excuses_for_acquitting_jason_stockley_of_murder_are_pathetic.html 
[https://perma.cc/98ZK-X7QR]. 
 114. Id. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1313 (2018) 
1332 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
The Sixth Circuit took a similarly officer-centric approach to 
video on summary judgment in Marvin v. City of Taylor.115 The case 
involved claims of excessive force arising from the arrest of the 
plaintiff on a DUI charge and his transportation to the police station. 
Events at the station house were videotaped, and the court relied on 
the videos as the sole touchstone for its factual analysis in reversing 
denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.116 
The court went a step beyond Scott. It demanded that the video 
affirmatively corroborate plaintiff’s testimony and show what the 
court viewed as excessive force; it disregarded plaintiff testimony 
because the video (as the court viewed it) did not affirmatively 
support that testimony. The plaintiff alleged that one of the defendant 
officers pulled him out of the car and threw him to the ground, but 
the court insisted that the video did not clearly show this and refused 
to credit the plaintiff’s testimony as a supplement. The video, taken 
from the opposite side of the car and offering an obstructed view, 
only showed the officer opening the door, reaching into the car, 
closing the door, then bending down and helping the plaintiff to his 
feet; it did not show the officer “abusing” the plaintiff. Although the 
video, as understood, did not blatantly contradict the plaintiff’s 
assertions as in Scott, it did not support them. And by not supporting 
the plaintiff’s version of events, the video “certainly cast[] strong 
doubts on [his] characterization.”117 
The plaintiff in Marvin also testified that the officers had 
gratuitously pulled his injured arm into the small of his back while 
taking off the handcuffs from behind. According to the court, while 
the video appeared to show the plaintiff’s arms being raised into the 
small of his back, the officer also could be seen crouching when 
inserting the key to unlock the cuffs, presumably to avoid making the 
plaintiff raise his arms. Based on (their interpretation of) the video, 
the judges concluded that “the officers’ conduct cannot reasonably be 
construed as gratuitous.”118 The possibility of an officer-favorable 
interpretation of the video justified the court adopting that 
interpretation and granting summary judgment, regardless of 
differing testimony. 
The competing inferences from one video and between video 
and testimony do work against law enforcement and in favor of the 
public challenging police conduct. 
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One example is the 2017 prosecution of activist Cristina Winsor. 
Winsor was acquitted of misdemeanor charges of disorderly conduct 
and walking in a roadway following her arrest during a police-reform 
protest in New York City.119 The state trial judge found bystander-
citizen video showed something “totally different” from what officers 
said happened.120 
Winsor’s case is unique and telling in several respects. The judge 
viewed the officers as “quite credibl[e]” on “first blush,”121 reflecting 
the common judicial tendency. That conclusion turned only after the 
judge viewed the video. The more common case moves in the other 
direction—video looks bad for the officer (as do many videos of 
violent encounters and police use of force),122 but is overcome by the 
officer’s testimony as to his belief about things not shown in the video 
or by his explanation and justification for what the video appears to 
show. 
The contradictions between the officers’ testimony and the video 
of the protest at which Winsor was arrested were obvious and 
objective. They did not revolve around issues of discretion, judgments 
of what was reasonable in the moment, or questions of what the 
officer might have subjectively feared from the suspect. They were 
about objective elements in the video such as whether scaffolding 
blocked the sidewalks (the officers said there was none, while the 
video showed some)123 or the presence of white-shirted officers (the 
officers said none were present, while the video showed white-shirted 
officers on the scene).124 These video images required less 
interpretation, making them less subject to demographic factors 
affecting perception and interpretation, compared with video of what 
might or might not be a peaceful protest or what might or might not 
constitute excessive force. 
The stakes in a proceeding also affect how a trial court 
approaches and interprets video, as they do other evidentiary and 
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legal judgments.125 Judges and juries may be willing to view video less 
favorably to law enforcement in a misdemeanor summons case such 
as Winsor’s compared with a high-value §	1983 action for excessive 
use of deadly force by a plaintiff killed126 or seriously injured127 or a 
murder prosecution of a police officer arising from performance of his 
dangerous duties in a dangerous situation.128 
A second example involves a §	1983 action arising from the use 
of deadly force in a traffic case, with the court approaching video in 
the proper way that Plumhoff and Scott declined. In Lewis v. Charter 
Township of Flint,129 the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment, 
rejecting that the video conclusively showed the plaintiff posed any 
danger to the officer or others in the area and repeatedly insisting 
that the court must view the video in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving plaintiff.130 The dissent unintentionally captured the 
competing approaches to video evidence, arguing that the majority’s 
finding of competing possible conclusions “is not the video I have 
reviewed.”131 
The evidentiary advantage may be enhanced when officers do 
not utilize police-controlled video technology. In her study of the 
frequency of police recording, Fan finds that officers often ignore 
departmental regulations for police-controlled recording, fail to 
record events, or fail to record them fully and completely.132 
Removing video from the evidentiary record returns the factfinding 
weight to competing testimony, restoring the officer’s evidentiary 
advantage. 
Fan seeks to undo the evidentiary benefit and thus the perverse 
incentive not to record or not to record fully. She proposes that courts 
exclude partial or incomplete recordings (where the officer 
improperly failed to record all appropriate portions of the encounter) 
and impose a positive inference that the missing video would have 
provided information supporting the citizen (whether as criminal 
defendant or civil rights plaintiff) and running against the officer or 
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the state.133 This places a thumb on the evidentiary scale in favor of 
the public’s civil rights without requiring courts to find that an officer 
intentionally hid or destroyed evidence of misconduct.134 
III.  CITIZEN VIDEO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE PROBLEM 
OF RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 
The trend moves towards having less rather than more publicly 
visible police-created video by narrowing the frequency of camera use 
and the availability of resulting video. The 2014 PERF Report 
recommended that departmental policies give officers discretion over 
when to record, which has become the common position.135 Most 
departments surveyed adopted a “limited discretion model”; officers 
were required to record certain enforcement activities and given 
discretion to record others but given no guidance about whether or 
when to record consensual encounters, the incidents in which many 
violations occur.136 In Michael White’s words, if recording is not 
mandated, an incident will not be recorded.137 That approach 
comports with the preferences of rank-and-file officers.138 Police 
departments and governments also have resisted making the resulting 
videos broadly available, adopting “blanket or overly broad 
exemptions from public disclosure.”139 States exempt dashcam and 
body-camera videos from open-records or FOIA laws,140 with 
departments using video more for internal training than for public 
awareness of police activity or for establishing police liability and 
accountability to the public. 
Exacerbating that problem is officers failing to record (or to 
record fully and completely), even when required to do so by laws 
and department regulations, as Fan describes in her studies.141 
Officers turn off or fail to engage cameras, whether erroneously or 
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intentionally, resulting in non-recording or selective and partial 
recording of events.142 Formal departmental policies, even those 
requiring broader recording, yield to officer practices on the ground, 
undermining the accountability and transparency goals and 
amplifying the “gross imbalance in power” between police and the 
public.143 
Fan’s proposal that courts adopt inferences adverse to the 
government where video is inappropriately unavailable reduces some 
government incentive to limit the creation and availability of video.144 
The broader answer to decreasing police-controlled video must be 
increasing citizen-created and -controlled video to fill the gap. This 
ensures recordings of many police-public encounters regardless of 
departmental policies or officers’ conformity with policies. 
But citizen video fills those gaps only if members of the public 
are constitutionally entitled and practically able to record police 
activity and their interactions with officers. Taking as a given the 
existence of the right as elaborated by courts and commentators, this 
Part considers the problems in recognizing, enforcing, and vindicating 
that right, whatever its nature, source, and scope. 
A. Toward a First Amendment Right to Record 
Six federal courts of appeals agree that the First Amendment 
grants individuals the right to record police and other officials in the 
course of performing their public duties in public spaces—the 
Eleventh Circuit,145 Ninth Circuit,146 First Circuit,147 Seventh Circuit,148 
Fifth Circuit,149 and Third Circuit.150 The lone contrary view came 
from Judge Posner dissenting in the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the 
privacy concerns of individuals recorded interacting with police 
should prevail over any First Amendment interests the recorder may 
claim in hearing and electronically capturing that interaction.151 But 
Seth Kreimer argues that at least the early decisions recognized the 
right to record by assertion more than by explanation or argument.152 
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Scholars and courts have moved beyond the early efforts to identify 
the source, nature, and scope of the constitutional right to record. 
1.  Scholarly Arguments 
No single free-speech theory links the scholarly arguments in 
support of the First Amendment right to record. But each offers a 
sound basis for some constitutional right. 
a. Seth Kreimer 
Kreimer explores the expressive landscape created and defined 
by the emergence of “pervasive image capture,” the combination of 
digital photography, ubiquitous cell-phone cameras, and online 
venues for image sharing. The result is that 
almost any image we observe can be costlessly recorded, freely 
reproduced, and instantly transmitted worldwide. We live, 
relate, work, and decide in a world where image capture from 
life is routine, and captured images are part of ongoing 
discourse, both public and private. Capture of images has 
become an adjunct to memory and an accepted medium of 
connection and correspondence.153 
Like words inscribed on parchment, captured images are 
expressive, part of the cultural and political discourse. First 
Amendment protection attaches to all such expressive images, 
whether used publicly or whether the individual creates images with 
the intent to use them. Pervasive-image capture allows individuals to 
record and reflect on their memories and experiences, an essential 
component of the freedom of thought the First Amendment 
guarantees.154 And the technological ease of capturing and recording 
those images cannot be disaggregated from the technological ease of 
disseminating them, as both are part of a “broader digital ecology of 
communication.”155 
Citizen recording is constitutionally essential to balance official 
police-controlled recording. Images are often more salient than verbal 
descriptions—more powerful in their persuasive ability,156 if not 
necessarily more accurate or more singular in meaning. “Participants 
in public dialogue who are barred from capturing images are at a 
substantial discursive disadvantage vis-à-vis those who can record 
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from life. Officials engage in virtually unchecked surveillance of 
public encounters. A rule that bars citizens from capturing images 
gives unbalanced authority to official framing.”157 
b. Justin Marceau and Alan Chen 
Building off Kreimer’s argument about advancements in digital 
recording and distribution, Marceau and Chen argue that this 
“creates transformative ways for individuals to participate in 
democracy and inform public discourse about not only political and 
social issues but also broader understandings about the truths of the 
universe, including complex moral questions,” such as abortion, food 
safety, and police misconduct.158 Recording “adds to the body of 
knowledge about the most controversial aspects of contemporary 
society.”159 And if recording itself is not a species of expression, image 
capture is conduct “essential to speech”; as writing, speaking, and 
other conduct used for expression are speech, so is the creation and 
production of images that may be exhibited and viewed.160 
The scope of the right that Marceau and Chen define varies by 
context. The Constitution protects the right to record in locations 
where the recorder “has a legal right to be present.”161 This includes 
publicly accessible spaces, on one’s own private property, on 
another’s private property with that owner’s consent or knowledge, 
and on private property without owner consent where the recording 
pertains to a matter of public concern or has a strong connection to 
public discourse.162 The right remains subject to reasonable, content-
neutral time, place, and manner restrictions,163 and it may yield to 
government interests, including protection of personal privacy.164 But 
nondisruptive recording in public—the paradigm for citizens 
recording police officers performing police functions—should remain 
immune from government regulation.165 
c. Carol Rice Andrews 
Writing before the twenty-first century explosion of citizen-
controlled recording technology, Andrews grounds a right to record 
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in the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, identifying a core right to 
file winning civil rights claims against government officials in court.166 
That right to seek and obtain legal remedies from government 
officials through formal government channels is at least as important 
as the right to engage in general public speech about those officials.167 
The petition right also requires “breathing room” in the form of 
broader protections for related non-core petition activities.168 One 
non-core activity is the right to file losing civil rights suits, a buffer to 
secure the core right of filing winning suits.169 That is, an individual 
can file winning suits only if she retains a right to file all suits and to 
risk losing. 
A second non-core right should be recording the public law-
enforcement misconduct giving rise to those winning civil rights 
claims, whether the recording is created by the injured person or by a 
bystander observing the encounter. Recording both “captures” the 
transaction or occurrence giving rise to the winning claim and 
“preserves” evidence of the event with which a plaintiff may be able 
to prove that winning claim. 
d. Jane Bambauer 
Bambauer begins from the premise that the First Amendment 
protects the “creation of knowledge. Expanded knowledge is an end 
goal of American speech rights, and accurate information, along with 
other, more subjective expressions, provides the fuel.”170 She 
identifies a negative “right to create knowledge” as a “latent 
prerequisite for free expression. Speech does very little for a 
government’s constituents if it is not supported by commitments to 
free thought and information flow.”171 This right ensures that 
government “will not interfere unduly with its constituents 
learning.”172 
Protecting the creation of knowledge includes protecting 
electronic data as speech.173 Speaking of photography with reasoning 
that applies to live-action video and audio recording, Bambauer 
argues that the First Amendment protects the photographs or other 
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recordings, not the act of creating those recordings. But the “very 
purpose of a photography ban is to prevent a wider audience from 
seeing the scene” photographed, so government-imposed restrictions 
or bans on photos (and necessarily on video- and audio-recording) 
must be understood, and declared invalid, as “designed to cut down 
on communicative potential.”174 A “law prohibiting the creation, 
maintenance, or distribution of digital information attempts to 
achieve its social goals by limiting the accumulation of knowledge. 
Data privacy laws strive to give individuals the power to decide who 
does and does not get to learn about them.”175 
e. Jud Campbell 
Campbell defines “speech-facilitating conduct” as conduct, often 
non-expressive, that facilitates or enables speech.176 He adopts an 
“anti-targeting rule” under which laws regulating non-expressive 
conduct raise free-speech problems when singling out and targeting 
speech or the speech process.177 This anti-targeting rule best explains 
protection for recording: 
Cameras and other audiovisual recording devices are 
conventional means of communication—that is, they are 
conventionally used for communicative purposes. Targeted 
regulations of audiovisual recording thus single out conduct 
commonly associated with expression and impose an apparent 
disproportionate burden on speech.178 
Campbell praises the Seventh Circuit decision in ACLU of 
Illinois v. Alvarez179 enjoining enforcement of the Illinois 
eavesdropping statute as applied to listening to and recording police 
officers performing public functions during public events.180 The 
statute operated “at the front end of the speech process by restricting 
the use of a common, indeed ubiquitous, instrument of 
communication.”181 The court recognized that the statute burdened 
First Amendment rights “directly, not incidentally,” by “specifically 
target[ing] a communication technology.”182 On Campbell’s model, 
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the law targeted communication technology that, even if not 
expressive in every use, had “readily apparent disproportionate 
effects on speech.”183 
2.  Current Judicial Decisions 
In 2017, two federal courts of appeals sought to move beyond 
Kreimer’s criticism that the right to record had been announced but 
not explained by locating the right to record within existing First 
Amendment doctrinal and scholarly norms. 
The Fifth Circuit identified an amalgam of the right to film, the 
right to gather information, and the right of listeners to receive 
information.184 The Third Circuit added the right to access 
information about official activities—recording is one way to more 
accurately observe, see, and hear what officers do in public.185 That 
court also emphasized what Vincent Blasi labeled the First 
Amendment’s “checking value,” under which the press and public 
speak as a means to expose and stop government misconduct.186 
Citizen-controlled video offers new and different perspectives that 
compete with official versions of events, enabling members of the 
public to perform a role similar to that of the news media.187 
Both courts also acknowledged the increase in police-controlled 
recording, which could not be allowed to stand alone. Citizen-
controlled video supplements police video in spurring departmental 
change, aiding and furthering investigations of wrongdoing, and 
confirming dead-ends where no wrongdoing occurred.188 
By framing the right in this way, the Third Circuit removed from 
the constitutional calculus whether the recording citizen intended to 
disseminate or use the resulting video. Requiring intent produced 
too-limited a right. An individual may not develop the intent to put 
the recording to expressive use until later, once she has an 
opportunity to review the recording and to reflect on the story the 
video tells (in her subjective and politically determined view). It 
makes no constitutional sense to allow officers to prevent an 
individual from recording based on that individual’s present intent, 
thereby depriving her of the opportunity to develop different intent 
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once she knows more about the recording and the events captured 
and reflected in that recording.189 
 
B. Procedural Barriers to Rights Enforcement 
Courts have defined and enforced the right to record in a way 
that produces an odd paradox. Governments and government officials 
have a perverse incentive to record or to require recording of as few 
encounters as possible and to disclose as little video as possible, 
whether through policies, officer discretion, or officer disregard for 
their regulatory obligations. Uniform recognition of a First 
Amendment right to record should restore the balance—if officers do 
not record and preserve a record, members of the public will. 
But police officers have a complementary incentive to limit 
public recording or disclosure by involved citizens and bystanders, 
thereby eliminating any video or audio record of an encounter. The 
result is absence of any record of a police-public encounter gone 
wrong, leaving proof to the he-said/he-said testimony that favors 
police and government officials.190 Mere recognition of that First 
Amendment right is not sufficient; the right must be vigorous in its 
scope and in its enforcement. Unfortunately, procedural limitations 
on civil rights litigation may limit the enforceability of the First 
Amendment right and its effectiveness in checking police misconduct.  
1.  Establishing Individual Liability 
Constitutional challenges to police efforts to prevent citizens 
from recording—constitutional claims to vindicate the First 
Amendment right to record—typically arise in §	1983 actions against 
individual officers, seeking damages for past, completed rights 
violations. In the typical right-to-record case, officers prevented an 
individual from recording a completed encounter, then the individual 
sued the officer for damages. Recording plaintiffs may find that it is 
“damages or nothing”191 because no other proceedings allow them to 
assert and vindicate that right. In most cases, the recorder is not 
arrested or charged for attempting to record.192 Or the recorder is 
released after a brief “conversation,” likely designed to deter the 
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person from attempting to record in the future.193 Or the recorder is 
arrested but charges are withdrawn when the arresting officer, 
recognizing his speciousness, does not appear at the state 
proceeding194 or when that proceeding reveals the basis for the 
charges to be invalid.195 
The Fifth Circuit cited this procedural posture to justify taking 
the odd (and arguably inappropriate) step of determining and 
announcing the scope of the First Amendment right and declaring it 
clearly established “for the future” without determining whether the 
officers violated the plaintiff’s rights at the time and on the facts of 
the case.196 The court feared that a court could address the 
constitutional issue only in this case or a procedurally similar damages 
action, so it availed itself of the opportunity to resolve the merits issue 
going forward. 
But police officers and other executive officials can avoid 
litigation and liability on all claims for constitutional damages through 
the defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity provides that a 
government officer can be liable for damages only for conduct that 
violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time 
of the conduct, such that a reasonable officer would have known that 
his conduct violated the constitutional right at issue.197 No officer in 
the Fifth or Third Circuit cases was held liable; all were granted 
qualified immunity because the right to record was not clearly 
established at the time of the challenged events.198 This followed two 
Third Circuit decisions in which the court pretermitted the merits of 
the First Amendment question and held that any constitutional right 
that might exist had not been clearly established.199 
The Supreme Court has made the qualified-immunity doctrine 
strongly protective of police officers, particularly on Fourth 
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Amendment search-and-seizure and excessive-force claims, to the 
point that it at least appears difficult to impossible to establish officer 
liability.200 Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”201 A right is 
“clearly established” only by a strong consensus of lower-court cases 
with somewhat similar facts and officers acting in similar 
circumstances, defining the right in light of the facts of which the 
defendant officer was aware and not at too high a level of 
generality.202 The Court has been coy about whether one binding 
decision from a regional circuit is sufficient to clearly establish the 
right within that circuit, assuming it might but never finding a right 
clearly established based on a single lower-court decision.203 Policies 
of the relevant executive department may provide officers with notice 
of clearly established law.204 A right also may be so obvious that it can 
be clearly established as general principle without factually similar 
precedent,205 but the bar for obviousness is high.206 The result is the 
Supreme Court holding that police officers were entitled to qualified 
immunity in almost a dozen cases in the past decade—several of them 
summary reversals of lower-court denials of immunity.207 
The risk is that courts will apply qualified immunity in First 
Amendment right-to-record cases in the same officer-protective 
manner as in Fourth Amendment cases. The Third Circuit in Fields 
concluded that the right to record was not clearly established despite 
the unanimous view of (at the time) five sister circuits and every 
district court within the Third Circuit to consider the question.208 It 
also refused to accept Philadelphia Police Department policies and 
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regulations as a basis for clearly establishing the right. In the wake of 
prior right-to-record decisions, the department adopted official 
policies recognizing that citizens enjoyed a First Amendment right to 
record police in public; the policy statements sought to eliminate 
officers’ confusion on the street, to ensure officers knew their duties, 
and to place the department “on the forefront rather than on the back 
end” in understanding and respecting this developing constitutional 
right.209 A Commissioner’s Memorandum stated that officers should 
reasonably expect to be recorded or photographed and that they 
“shall not” obstruct or prevent recording or disable the recording 
devices.210 But the majority emphasized evidence that the policies 
were ignored, were ineffective in informing officers that the 
constitutional right existed, or were not being followed, meaning the 
existence of the regulations could not show a knowing constitutional 
violation.211 It pointed to testimony from one high-ranking 
department official that, despite the written policies, officers did not 
understand that there was a constitutional right to record.212 
Despite recent decisions and scholarly consensus, future §	1983 
plaintiffs seeking damages for the denial of the right to record may 
encounter a number of problems. It is unclear whether six circuits 
provide a sufficiently “robust” consensus213 to clearly establish the 
right. It is not certain that the right is even clearly established in the 
Third Circuit or the Fifth Circuit (despite the latter’s insistence that it 
was clearly establishing the right “for the future”214), as the Supreme 
Court has never recognized a right as clearly established in a circuit 
by a single circuit-court decision. 
The Third Circuit in Fields found the right to record was not 
clearly established, insisting that no part of a broad canvas of existing 
law and policy enabled defendant officers to understand their conduct 
to be unlawful. Prior cases recognizing the right involved individuals 
who recorded with the intent to publish or use the video, establishing 
a right different from the right to record without clear intent to 
publish that the plaintiffs exercised in this case.215 The Seventh Circuit 
decision in Alvarez did not provide sufficient notice, as it involved a 
constitutional challenge to an eavesdropping law prohibiting listening 
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and recording without regard to later use or publication of any 
recording216 (Jud Campbell agrees that Alvarez should not be 
characterized as a right-to-record case because the statute prevented 
only capture, not recording and dissemination).217 
Even if sufficient to clearly establish, that lone precedent may 
lack sufficient factual overlap. Distinctions are always possible and 
seemingly small and insignificant differences between precedent and 
current factual circumstances may be sufficient to avoid liability in a 
doctrinal morass that one scholar compared to the “one-bite rule for 
bad dogs[,] start[ing] over with every change in weather 
conditions.”218 
The Third Circuit suggested that there might be a 
constitutionally meaningful factual distinction between recording a 
traffic stop and recording a sidewalk confrontation,219 rendering the 
right not clearly established in the different context. Factual 
distinctions may prevent Turner v. Lieutenant Driver220 from clearly 
establishing much in the Fifth Circuit. Dissenting, Judge Clement 
emphasized that the plaintiff had been photographing the police 
station building, which did not clearly establish the right to video-
record the building or the right to photograph or video-record officers 
performing police functions.221 
Any First Amendment right also remains subject to reasonable, 
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions,222 such as the 
officer’s needs for security and safety, for himself and others, in 
performing dangerous functions. This compels a new inquiry in each 
case into the details of the underlying events and circumstances and 
whether the officer reasonably could have believed that the recording 
interfered with his public duties, compared with previous incidents. 
Overcoming qualified immunity and establishing constitutional 
liability leads to a second hurdle—a claim that a police officer 
prevented plaintiff from recording or momentarily stopped and 
questioned her actions, although violative of the First Amendment, 
may not produce substantial injury and may leave the plaintiff to 
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recover only nominal damages.223 This is especially so in the 
circumstances giving rise to Fields and Turner, where no arrests or 
prosecutions followed and any seizures or detentions to prevent the 
plaintiffs from recording lasted a short time.224 And liable officers 
likely will not pay even that nominal-damages judgment, as the 
government indemnifies officers in virtually all cases.225 The limited 
remedy may remove the incentive for an individual to bring the 
lawsuit, especially faced with overcoming qualified immunity. Right-
to-record plaintiffs would benefit from James Pfander’s proposal to 
allow §	1983 plaintiffs to forgo substantial damages and limit their 
claims to nominal damages in exchange for the elimination of 
immunity as a defense.226  
Such disincentives or barriers to successful litigation decrease or 
limit the amount and availability of citizen-controlled video, leaving 
officers with the incentive to prevent recording where they can. A 
determined officer might be willing to shut down a citizen’s recording 
efforts. He avoids being recorded and having video of his misconduct 
emerge (while already declining to activate his own recording 
technology), taking a chance that some legal or factual distinction will 
allow him to avoid liability in the subsequent §	1983 action or that any 
judgment will be de minimis and paid by the municipality rather than 
out of his pocket. 
2.  Legislative Limitations 
Officers are not activating their police-controlled recording even 
when required to do so by law or department regulation.227 Two 
policymaking problems exacerbate that problem. One is inconsistency 
as to the level at which recording rules and policies should be made—
state, municipal, or departmental—producing piecemeal and 
confusing rules and obligations.228 The second is that those 
policymakers, whatever their level, are enacting insufficiently broad 
recording policies and excessively narrow disclosure policies.229 
Citizen-controlled recording again should fill the gap when 
formal regulations and practical conduct combine to limit the 
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available video evidence around a police-public incident. But the 
same state, local, and departmental legislative efforts that limit the 
creation and availability of police-controlled recording could be 
aimed at citizen-controlled recording. 
In 2015, Texas Representative Jason Villalba introduced a bill 
defining the existing crime of interrupting, disrupting, impeding, or 
interfering with a peace officer to include “filming, recording, 
photographing, or documenting the officer within twenty-five feet of 
the officer,” or within one hundred feet if carrying a gun, with an 
affirmative defense that the recorder was a member of or working for 
the media.230 The obvious target, as the media carve-out 
demonstrated, was citizens recording their police encounters or 
encounters they witnessed between police and other members of the 
public. 
Such a bill violates the First Amendment, running afoul of the 
newly recognized right to record, including in the Fifth Circuit. It 
treats expressive conduct less favorably than non-expressive 
conduct—or, in Jud Campbell’s framing, it treats non-expressive 
conduct that facilitates speech less favorably than non-expressive 
conduct unconnected to the speech process.231 A person could stand 
within twenty-five feet of a peace officer, even when carrying a gun, if 
not otherwise impeding the officer, so long as not engaged in the 
(expressive or pre-expressive) act of recording; the identical person 
operating a recording device breaks the law. But either person 
implicates the purported interest in non-interference with police 
functions. 
This bill also treats media members more favorably than non-
media persons performing the same recording function. It is not clear 
how a media member recording within twenty feet of the officer 
interferes or impedes more than a non-media member in the same 
time and place or why media members should be treated more 
favorably than non-media members engaged in identical expressive 
(or pre-expressive) conduct.232 Although the right to record remains 
subject to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, such 
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special disfavored treatment of citizen-controlled recording is not 
neutral as to speaker or content.233 
Villalba withdrew the bill after receiving criticism from everyone 
on all sides of the political spectrum.234 But his failed effort does not 
mean that state, local, or department officials lack the identical 
motivation to protect officers from the perceived harassment and 
negative attention that comes from being subject to constant 
recording through competently drafted laws.235 As long as the First 
Amendment right to record remains subject to limitations, 
policymakers may attempt to restrict when or how recording should 
take place in service of purportedly neutral values such as non-
interference, officer safety, public safety, or protection of officer and 
public privacy.236 
That such legislation violates the First Amendment in the 
abstract does not resolve the issue. Nor does the argument that the 
purported governmental interests are either pretext for government 
wanting to hide matters from public scrutiny or should not be strong 
enough to justify a ban on public recordings.237 Right-holders must 
overcome numerous procedural hurdles to enforce and vindicate that 
constitutional right and to obtain judicial remedies barring 
enforcement of these formal laws, at least without having to endure 
state enforcement and prosecution for attempting to record. 
A person arrested or prevented from recording a police 
encounter pursuant to a formal anti-recording law or policy could sue 
the arresting officer for damages for violating her First Amendment 
rights, the same strategy as those prevented from recording by an 
officer exercising individual discretion. That plaintiff confronts the 
same problems described above—qualified immunity and the nominal 
value of the claim to a prevailing plaintiff.238 
In fact, this plaintiff faces a greater qualified-immunity hurdle, 
because the officer can defend his action on the ground that he was 
enforcing presumptively valid state law239 or department 
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regulations;240 he therefore was neither plainly incompetent nor 
knowingly violating the First Amendment. The plaintiff would have 
to meet the burden of establishing that the statute or regulation was 
obviously and blatantly unconstitutional, such that no reasonable or 
not-plainly incompetent officer could have believed the recording ban 
could be valid and enforceable.241 
A plaintiff might instead sue the municipality, arguing that the 
officer arrested her pursuant to a constitutionally defective formal 
policy enacted by a final policymaker.242 Municipalities cannot assert 
immunity defenses,243 so the plaintiff could recover (if only nominal 
damages) for the violation, even if the right was not clearly 
established or if there are factual distinctions between her case and 
prior cases. But if the challenged recording prohibition derived from a 
state statute (such as Villalba’s bill in Texas), the constitutional 
violation in a case of arrest by a municipal or county police officer 
would have been caused by state law.244 Municipal liability requires 
that the constitutional violation be caused by that municipality’s 
policies or ordinances, not the policies of another entity that the 
municipality enforced. A local practice or policy of enforcing all state 
law is not sufficient to establish liability for its enforcement of any 
particular constitutionally deficient state statute. Unless the 
municipality took additional steps to adopt the state prohibition 
against recording as a municipal ordinance or to promulgate a formal 
local policy of enforcing that specific state law, a plaintiff will be 
unable to establish entity liability.245 
A third option is a pre-enforcement action against state or local 
officials to enjoin enforcement of the anti-recording law as violating 
the First Amendment. Qualified immunity does not apply in actions 
for equitable relief.246 Instead, pre-enforcement plaintiffs face 
standing problems. 
Under O’Shea v. Littleton,247 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,248 and 
Clapper v. Amnesty International,249 courts are reluctant to accord 
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standing to plaintiffs challenging law-enforcement policies and 
practices that affect the plaintiffs only when police attempt to enforce 
other valid substantive laws against them. The plaintiffs in O’Shea 
lacked standing to challenge discriminatory state-court charging, bail, 
and sentencing practices; the claim required impermissible 
speculation that at some future point the plaintiff would be arrested 
for violating a constitutionally valid substantive criminal provision 
and become subject to the challenged criminal procedures.250 The 
plaintiff in Lyons lacked standing to obtain an injunction barring city 
police from future use of a constitutionally dubious chokehold; he 
could not predict if or when he would be stopped by police for a 
traffic or other legal violation, if or when the encounter would go 
south, and if or when the chokehold would be applied to him.251 The 
plaintiffs in Clapper lacked standing to challenge a federal law 
permitting certain national-security surveillance; they could not 
predict if or when they or people they communicated with would be 
targeted for surveillance, successfully surveilled, and surveilled 
through the challenged law in government efforts to enforce other 
federal criminal and national-security laws.252 
Consider how and when a prohibition on recording would be 
enforced. An officer seizes or initiates an encounter with a person for 
some crime, infraction, or matter; that person attempts to record the 
encounter; and the officer prevents her pursuant to the anti-recording 
law. Or a person comes upon an officer seizing another person for 
some crime, infraction, or matter; the person attempts to record that 
encounter; and the officer breaks from his seizure of the first target to 
stop the recorder pursuant to the anti-recording law. Standing for any 
pre-enforcement challenge requires the court to “speculate” that the 
plaintiff will be seized by police or will witness another person being 
seized by police for some other conduct or crime, that she will 
attempt to record, and that she will be prevented from recording that 
incident by the officer enforcing the recording ban.253 A court may be 
unwilling to accommodate such conjecture prior to enforcement, as 
opposed to in an action in which the police completed the 
infringement of the First Amendment by preventing recording and 
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the plaintiff seeks a retroactive remedy (and faces the hurdle of 
qualified immunity).254 
Courts apply more relaxed standing analysis to pre-enforcement 
First Amendment challenges; judges are more willing to allow 
plaintiffs to preemptively raise their constitutional rights, rather than 
requiring them to engage in the targeted expressive (or pre-
expressive) conduct and risk arrest and enforcement of the 
constitutionally suspect law.255 Even in First Amendment cases, a 
plaintiff must show “an intention to engage in a course of conduct 
arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a 
statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution 
thereunder.”256 She must show a present intention to engage in the 
statutorily prohibited expressive activity at a specific, imminent 
future, subjecting herself to likely enforcement. 
The ACLU established standing in Alvarez, although the court 
recognized that the organization “does not know precisely when it or 
its employees would face prosecution or which officers would be 
involved.”257 The court did not demand a showing of intent to record 
at any particular imminent protest. It distinguished Lyons because the 
threat of prosecution did not hinge on unknowable future events or 
details of how a violation would occur. The ACLU sought to 
implement an organizational program of recording police at future 
“‘expressive activity’ events—protests and demonstrations—in public 
fora in and around the Chicago area.”258 Because such events were 
certain to occur and because the ACLU’s organizational policy and 
practice was to attend and record many or all of those events, the 
organization’s activity and the likelihood of enforcement against them 
moved beyond speculative, even if it could not identify the date of the 
event to be recorded. 
Media members might be able to establish standing along similar 
lines. The media’s job is to observe, record, and report on public 
events, so enforcement of the statute against them is less speculative; 
they will report on and attempt to record future events such as public 
protests or rallies that are certain to occur and at which police may 
attempt to enforce a statutory recording ban. Of course, media 
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organizations and individuals working for media organizations were 
exempt from Villalba’s proposed Texas bill259 and the Illinois law at 
issue in Alvarez,260 and likely would be exempt from similar legislative 
prohibitions on recording. 
Jocelyn Simonson’s copwatchers261 also may be able to establish 
standing. They operate in organized groups of local residents 
patrolling neighborhoods in planned times, places, and manners, 
monitoring police conduct, educating citizens, and undertaking other 
efforts to deter police misconduct before it occurs.262 Video-recording 
is one recent addition to copwatchers’ repertoire263 and their 
recording is as deliberate, scheduled, and organized as their patrol 
activities.264 Like the ACLU and the media, their regular organization 
and consistent activities allow them to show present intent to record 
inevitable future events through their regular planned activities, even 
if the date or place of the events recorded and of enforcement of the 
recording ban is unknown at the time of litigation. 
Ordinary, spontaneous, individual citizen-recorders acting on 
their own may not be so fortunate. They will be less able to show 
when or where they will witness or be involved in an individual 
encounter that they want to record, lacking formal job obligations or 
organizational plans to attend events or encounters at which 
recording, and efforts to enforce a recording ban, will occur. Unable 
to show when or where they want to record an encounter, they will be 
less able to show when or where the recording ban will be enforced 
against them. Those isolated, individual events look more like 
O’Shea, Lyons, and Clapper, where the when and how of a future 
encounter with law enforcement and attempted enforcement of the 
challenged law is less known and more speculative or conjectural. 
But the individual right to record police is most essential in these 
below-the-radar, individual police-public engagements. It is difficult 
to stop dozens of media members or hundreds of protesters with 
cameras from recording a public protest or expressive event (although 
police tried during the Ferguson protests265), other than by halting the 
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protest event, which raises separate, more fundamental First 
Amendment concerns.266 Police traditionally accorded media 
members freer rein in covering protests and other events, although 
some of that deference was lost in the Ferguson protests and since.267 
Citizens who engage in copwatching describe a mutual respect 
between themselves and the officers they observe, a sense that both 
sides are doing their jobs, with no sign of officers trying to intimidate 
the watchers or stop their activities, including recording.268  
Spontaneous and isolated individual recorders do not receive 
similar respect or deference. It is easier for police to prevent a single 
recorder from capturing a single random encounter, giving officers a 
greater incentive to do so. Yet standing doctrine may place these 
encounters beyond pre-enforcement constitutional challenge. The 
result is a paradox—it is easier for police to enforce an arguably 
constitutionally violative prohibition on recording but more difficult 
for plaintiffs to preemptively challenge its constitutional validity. 
3.  Municipal Liability for Individuals Encounters 
A plaintiff can establish municipal liability by showing that the 
municipality failed to properly train its officers or to establish 
sufficient policies guiding their conduct and that this failure caused 
the officer to violate that plaintiff’s rights in an individual 
encounter.269 Where an individual officer exercises his discretion to 
prevent an individual from recording, that individual might show that 
municipal policymakers did not provide constitutionally adequate 
policies or training to instruct officers that citizens have a First 
Amendment right to record and that officers must allow such 
recording to occur. 
In Fields, the Philadelphia Police Department promulgated 
regulations and adopted policy statements announcing a 
constitutional right to recording and reminding officers that they 
should reasonably expect to be recorded or photographed and that 
they “shall not” obstruct or prevent recording or disable the 
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recording devices.270 But the policies were ignored, were ineffective in 
informing officers that the constitutional right existed, or were not 
being followed; most officers were not aware the constitutional right 
existed.271 A municipality can be liable for establishing inadequate 
policies or for disregarding officers who do not adhere to adequate 
policies. But such failure-to-train liability is for “limited 
circumstances,” constrained by strict causation and state-of-mind 
requirements272 making it difficult for plaintiffs to prove. 
The Fields plaintiffs tried to establish failure to train through 
evidence of officers ignoring or being unaware of those policies.273 In 
this respect, municipal liability becomes the mirror of the individual 
defense of qualified immunity—what triggers municipal liability 
supports qualified immunity, while what overcomes qualified 
immunity suggests the absence of municipal liability. The Fields 
majority criticized the plaintiffs for attempting to use department 
policies and training to have it both ways—insisting that the policies 
clearly established the First Amendment right to record while arguing 
that the policies were “utterly ineffective” in conveying to officers the 
nature and details of that right.274  
C. The Problem of Officer Discretion 
Police-controlled video is marked by three trends: departments 
according officers discretion as to whether, what, and when to 
record;275 officers wielding that discretion in narrow ways;276 and 
officers failing to follow regulations when required to record.277 The 
trends are self-reinforcing, as every failure to record can be defended 
as an exercise of sound discretion. 
It is reasonable to expect that officers would be less likely to 
record—intentionally or otherwise, as a matter or discretion or 
otherwise—an encounter that has gone sideways and may embarrass 
the recording officer or his fellow officers. Fan offers a 2016 incident 
in San Francisco, in which sheriff’s deputies beat a suspect with metal 
batons, inflicting head and arm injuries requiring twelve days of 
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hospitalization; ten of the eleven involved officers failed to activate 
their body cameras, and the one who activated his camera did so by 
accident.278 
It also is reasonable to expect that officers, vested with similar 
discretion by legislation or policy, will be inclined to stop a citizen 
from recording an encounter that has gone sideways and that may 
produce video embarrassing one or more officers or make them look 
bad to the viewing public. The unrecorded 2016 incident in San 
Francisco came to light because a private video-security system 
captured the incident, and the owners of the system turned the video 
to the public defender.279 Had the officers been vested with power and 
discretion to stop that recording or its release, they likely would have 
exercised it. 
Qualified immunity protects executive discretion, to give police 
officers “breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken 
judgments”280 and to provide wide latitude for the vigorous exercise 
of constitutional judgment and discretion, rather than forcing them to 
steer too clear of the constitutional line out of fear of liability.281 Anti-
recording legislation vests officers with additional discretion and an 
additional weapon to control citizens and to eliminate potentially 
embarrassing video. This undermines the force of citizen-controlled 
video in establishing or restoring balance between police and the 
public in capturing images and in ensuring police accountability.282 
It is not clear how First Amendment doctrine might respond to 
this problem. Executive officers cannot wield unbridled and 
untrammeled enforcement discretion with respect to speech, as in 
granting parade permits.283 But discretion is inherent in policing, 
including as to what laws to enforce, how, and when.284 A plaintiff can 
state a First Amendment claim by showing that adverse police action 
was motivated by animus or disagreement with the message or 
content of her speech and with the intent to stop or retaliate because 
of her speech, although pleading and proving intent proves difficult 
for plaintiffs.285 Campbell’s framework for protecting speech-
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facilitating pre-expressive conduct can map onto that intent standard; 
subject heightened First Amendment scrutiny applies to laws and 
regulations that target the speech process by targeting recording as a 
speech-facilitating activity.286 
An officer who prevents a citizen from recording, whether 
pursuant to a statutory recording ban or his own discretion, targets 
the speech process when he is motivated by the desire to eliminate 
video that might expose him or his fellow officers acting in 
unconstitutional, or simply embarrassing, ways.287 This standard 
would have been satisfied in the events underlying Fields, as police in 
two separate incidents approached recorders with the intent of 
stopping otherwise non-interfering recording of potential police 
misconduct.288 
But courts may overlook content-discriminatory animus in 
retaliatory-arrest or retaliatory-prosecution cases where the officer 
had probable cause to arrest, because the causal connection between 
animus and injury (the arrest or prosecution) becomes more 
attenuated when probable cause exists.289 Plaintiffs in citizen-video 
cases thus face the same proof difficulties in showing that the officer 
intended to halt recording to avoid being shown performing his public 
functions in an inappropriate manner, rather than because he 
reasonably and with probable cause believed the recording interfered 
with legitimate law enforcement activities. 
*     *     * 
Citizen-controlled video, enhanced by a vigorous First 
Amendment right to record government officials performing official 
functions in public spaces, should be the answer to limits on the 
amount and availability of police-controlled video. But procedural 
realities of qualified immunity, limits on standing, unavailability of 
substantial damages, limits on municipal liability, and limits on proof 
make enforcement of that right difficult. Those difficulties together 
limit the force of citizen-controlled video as a tool for police reform 
or accountability. 
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IV.  VIDEO AND REMEDIATION 
Video’s role is not limited to litigation or the courtroom; it 
affects how government and the public react to police-public 
encounters and the public policy response to those encounters. The 
public takes to the streets to protest what it perceives as injustice. 
And the public is more likely to take to the streets when people can 
see and interpret video and when the results of formal legal processes 
do not match their assessments and interpretations of that video.290 
In responding to incidents of police-involved force, the 
government must account for the public’s visceral, brute-sense 
impressions and interpretations of a video, recognizing the Kahan 
insight that those impressions are determined by identity, ideology, 
political leanings, demographics, and experience. Regardless of how 
policymakers interpret and understand a recording, they must 
consider different reactions from a public adopting a different 
interpretation that becomes more outraged if government and 
government institutions do not respond in (what the viewing public 
regards as) an appropriate fashion. 
Governments respond to this concern in several ways. One is to 
attempt to change the laws to keep video from becoming public, 
thereby limiting the public response and public outrage. This explains 
Jason Villalba’s legislative effort to ban citizen recording of police.291 
And it explains efforts to exclude body-camera videos from public 
disclosure laws.292 In 2016, Missouri enacted a broad, blanket 
exemption from its open-records laws for body-camera and dashcam 
video, arguing that making video public would interfere with ongoing 
police investigations.293 That decision followed the state attorney 
general’s commission recommendation and the attorney general’s 
warning of technology “lead[ing] to a new era of voyeurism and 
entertainment television at the expense of Missourians’ privacy.”294 
But as Fan argues, “blanket or overly broad exemptions from 
public disclosure .	.	. defeat” the basic transparency and accountability 
goals of police-controlled recording.295 Video becomes a tool for 
protecting and exonerating officers against public complaints within 
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the department,296 without allowing the public into the conversation 
to see and decide what the video reveals about what happened in an 
encounter. Alternatively, government adopts a one-way disclosure 
policy, publicizing and speaking out about video that (in its view) 
supports its officers and shows no misconduct, while refusing to 
disclose images and recordings it views (or that the public is likely to 
view) as adverse to police and government interests.297 
A second, more positive, possibility is that public availability of 
video evidence, however created, prompts institutions to be more 
aggressive in challenging police misbehavior and seeking 
accountability for misconduct.298 There arguably has been a gradual 
shift in prosecutorial aggressiveness against police violence, especially 
in video cases, moving from the relative dark ages of 2014 to the 
present. 
NYPD officer Daniel Pantaleo was not indicted for the 2014 
strangulation death of Eric Garner299 and Cleveland police officers 
Timothy Loehmann and Frank Garmback were not indicted in the 
2014 shooting death of Tamir Rice,300 despite widely circulated video 
(from non-police sources) of both incidents. More recent cases have 
resulted in criminal charges and prosecutions—Ray Tensing in the 
shooting death of Samuel DuBose at the University of Cincinnati,301 
Yeonimo Yanez in the shooting death of Philando Castile in 
Minnesota,302 Jason Stockley in the shooting death of Anthony Lamar 
Smith in St. Louis, and Philip Brailsford in the shooting death of 
Daniel Shaver in Mesa, Arizona.303 Charges remain pending against 
multiple Chicago police officers for the 2015 shooting death of 
Laquan McDonald, where dashcam video, produced only after a 
state-court suit and judicial order compelling disclosure, told the 
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public a different story from official accounts and helped expose an 
attempted cover-up.304 A hung jury in the state homicide prosecution 
of Michael Slager in the shooting death of Walter Scott in South 
Carolina led to a federal civil rights prosecution of Slager for 
depriving Scott of his Fourth Amendment rights,305 a guilty plea, and 
a twenty-year federal prison sentence.306 
The results of these cases may not reflect positive outcomes or 
what many regard, based on their interpretations of the videos, as 
justice. Each prosecution in the first list was unsuccessful, resulting in 
acquittals or hung juries (sometimes multiple hung juries). Only 
Slager seems likely to serve prison time. Acquittals accompanied by 
graphic video, such as in the Shaver shooting, reinforce the cynical 
public belief that no amount of evidence is sufficient to convict a 
police officer. But the increased efforts suggest some limited 
movement toward success. State and federal prosecutors appear more 
willing to pursue criminal charges when video evidence, at least 
viscerally, supports a view that the officer did something 
constitutionally violative. 
Bryce Newell identifies an irony to this evolution. The demand 
for body-cams and video in police-shooting cases, including among 
rank-and-file police officers, began following the unrecorded shooting 
of Michael Brown in Ferguson. Subsequent cases featured video of 
some sort from some source, resulting in prosecutions but not 
necessarily accountability, while turning rank-and-file officers against 
cameras as a law-enforcement tool.307 
A third possibility is that video of a police-citizen incident 
prompts municipalities to expeditiously settle civil rights suits. The 
government avoids further public viewing, discussion, and debate 
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over video that is subjectively perceived as troubling, reducing the 
potential that anger erupts into public demonstrations.308 
Public attention and outrage over a viral video puts the 
government on its heels; it must defend its officers while reacting to 
adverse public perceptions and conclusions. The result is a split 
response—no criminal, administrative, or employment actions against 
the officers, but settlement as the path of least resistance in 
subsequent §	1983 or wrongful-death actions. The families of Scott, 
McDonald, Garner, DuBose, and Castile settled with the officers and 
municipalities for anywhere from $3 million to $6.5 million, often 
before or just after filing the lawsuit,309 even while the officers in each 
case escaped criminal punishment. Smith’s family settled for $900,000, 
although allegations that the state withheld DNA evidence during 
settlement negotiations (evidence that may have allowed the family to 
place a higher value on the case) may cause the court to reopen 
discovery and the settlement.310 
Katherine MacFarlane describes these civil cases as utilizing 
“accelerated civil rights settlement.”311 Plaintiffs bring or threaten 
small-bore §	1983 claims; they seek damages for the single event at 
issue, but not systemic departmental reform through broad injunctive 
relief; and the parties settle before or shortly after filing.312 While 
these lawsuits do not achieve systemic police reform, the settlements 
are with the municipality (rather than the officers313) and are 
substantial enough to add-up and incentivize the government to 
reform its training, supervision, policies, and programs to avoid future 
lawsuits and payments.314 Video, and fear of the public reaction to 
video that looks “bad,” prompts the government to pursue or accept 
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accelerated settlement, ending the legal dispute and any popular 
debate and controversy around the video and the problematic police 
encounter. 
A final, ironic, option is for government to undertake the 
difficult task of warning the public not to jump to conclusions about 
what happened because video is incomplete, non-objective, subject to 
the limits of the video frame, and open to varying interpretations 
based on the viewer’s political and personal perspectives. Officials 
can urge the public to accept that one video does not tell the whole 
story and to wait until they see and hear more video, more evidence, 
and more sides to the story. In other words, the solution is for 
government to discuss video in honest and accurate terms. 
But if the public’s brute-sense impression is that the video is 
unfavorable to the police, as in the settled high-profile death cases, 
this argument may prove practically and politically impossible.315 This 
tactic also contradicts the government position, in and out of 
litigation, when officials are confident in video’s officer-supportive 
message. In those cases, they insist that video is singular, conclusive, 
objective, unambiguous, and tells one story that exonerates the officer 
on summary judgment316 or justifies the decision not to pursue 
criminal charges against the officer. The cognitive dissonance and 
charges of political hypocrisy may be too much to overcome. 
CONCLUSION 
Public discussion of the benefits of video-recording cannot be 
disconnected from the legal and judicial processes within which video 
gets used and in which the benefits of video—police accountability, 
police reform, and enforcement and vindication of individual rights—
will be obtained. Whether video achieves its aims depends on how 
prosecutors, juries, grand juries, and judges process video and 
understand how to process video; procedural limitations on 
enforcement of constitutional rights; and public reactions to the legal 
process grounded in their own processing of video. It is important to 
talk about whether law enforcement should establish body-camera 
programs and the details of those programs; it is important to talk 
about whether the First Amendment protects a right to record. But it 
is essential that those conversations consider and account for the 
procedural problems considered here. 
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